Japan Tobacco International: : To ‘be the most successful and respected tobacco company in the world’ by MacKenzie, Ross et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rgph20
Download by: [University of York] Date: 31 January 2017, At: 08:48
Global Public Health
An International Journal for Research, Policy and Practice
ISSN: 1744-1692 (Print) 1744-1706 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgph20
Japan Tobacco International: To ‘be the most
successful and respected tobacco company in the
world’
Ross MacKenzie, Jappe Eckhardt & Ade Widyati Prastyani
To cite this article: Ross MacKenzie, Jappe Eckhardt & Ade Widyati Prastyani (2017) Japan
Tobacco International: To ‘be the most successful and respected tobacco company in the
world’, Global Public Health, 12:3, 281-299
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2016.1273368
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 31 Jan 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 3 View citing articles 
Japan Tobacco International: To ‘be the most successful and
respected tobacco company in the world’
Ross MacKenziea, Jappe Eckhardt b and Ade Widyati Prastyania
aDepartment of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia; bDepartment of Politics, University of
York, Heslington, York, UK
ABSTRACT
Japan Tobacco International (JTI) is the international division of
Japan Tobacco Incorporated, and the world’s third largest
transnational tobacco company. Founded in 1999, JTI’s rapid
growth has been the result of a global business strategy that
potentially serves as a model for other Asian tobacco companies.
This paper analyses Japan Tobacco Incorporated’s global
expansion since the 1980s in response to market opening, foreign
competition, and declining share of a contracting domestic
market. Key features of its global strategy include the on-going
central role and investment by the Japanese government, and an
expansion agenda based on mergers and acquisitions. The paper
also discusses the challenges this global business strategy poses
for global tobacco control and public health. This paper is part of
the special issue ‘The Emergence of Asian Tobacco Companies:
Implications for Global Health Governance’.
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Introduction
In 1999, Tokyo-based Japan Tobacco (JT) created its international tobacco division with
the goal of becoming ‘the most successful and respected tobacco company in the world’
(Japan Tobacco International [JTI], 2016a). In less than two decades, JTI has followed a
global business strategy of determined expansion based on mergers and acquisitions to
become the third largest transnational tobacco corporation (TTC). Parent company JT
is itself a relatively new corporation, launched by the Japanese government in 1985.
Until then, Japan’s tobacco business was overseen by a state-owned monopoly established
at the end the nineteenth century. In the 1980s the government converted the monopoly
into a publicly traded stock company, but continues to hold a significant investment in the
privatised operation.
Despite the emergence of JTI as a key global actor, there is limited research into its evol-
ution from a domestic monopoly into a leading TTC. While most work on tobacco indus-
try globalisation treats TTCs as part of a homogeneous industry in pursuit of global
expansion (Lee, Eckhardt, & Holden, 2016), this paper analyses the specific factors and
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strategies that have underpinned JTI’s global expansion, related implications for global
tobacco control, particularly the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC),
and assesses whether these strategies may provide a model for other Asian tobacco com-
panies contemplating similar expansion.
Background
The origins of JTI lie in nineteenth century tax evasion and Japan’s military build-up in the
early 1900s. Tobacco in Japan was treated as an agricultural product until 1873, when the
first of a series of taxation measures was introduced by the newly created Ministry of
Finance (Levin, 1997). Widespread tax evasion led the Ministry to recommend the intro-
duction of a monopoly system, which it could more closely control. Opposition by the
small number of domestic and overseas producers that had come to dominate the
market meant that a semi-monopolistic compromise agreed in 1898 was limited to the
sale of tobacco leaf. Full nationalisation in 1904 was aimed at raising revenue for
Japan’s war with Russia and, as Levin (1997, 2005) notes, as a way to force foreign inter-
ests, particularly the American Tobacco Company, from the domestic market.
Monopoly operations changed little until the post-Second World War reconstruction
of the Japanese economy, a process that included the creation of the Japan Tobacco
and Salt Public Corporation in 1949. The new organisation was given responsibility for
all domestic tobacco production as well as the tobacco leaf sector, wholesale and retail dis-
tribution (Levin, 2005), and domestic tobacco production and consumption rose steadily
over the next 35 years. In 1982, the monopoly accounted for 98.5% of all cigarette sales in
Japan (see Figure 1), a degree of dominance created by a 90% tariff rate on imported ciga-
rettes; state-control of licensed tobacco retail shops, which allowed only a limited number
to sell foreign tobacco products; and particularly restrictive rules on advertising and
Figure 1. Cigarette sales Japan. Domestic vs. imported brands, 1982–2014. Source: Compiled from
Japan Health Promotion & Fitness Foundation. (2015). Import Tobacco Share [data from Tobacco Insti-
tute of Japan: Tobacco Statistics] http://www.health-net.or.jp/tobacco/product/pd080000.html; Euro-
monitor (2015a). Cigarettes in Japan. London: Euromonitor International.
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promotion of imported brands (Honjo & Kawachi, 2000; Lambert, Sargent, Glantz, &
Ling, 2004).
By the 1980s, Japanese political opinion had shifted toward privatisation of state enter-
prises (Higashi & Lauter, 1987) as part of wide-ranging initiatives aimed at reforming the
national administration system, and addressing labour relations in the telephone, long-dis-
tance rail, and tobacco monopolies (Levin, 2005). Subsequent reform of the tobacco sector
was formalised by the 1984 Tobacco Business Act, designed to achieve industry growth,
secure government revenue, and contribute to the ‘healthy’ expansion of the national
economy. The Act also stipulated that the newly privatised company had to purchase the
entire usable domestic tobacco leaf crop, which would have long term implications. The
Japan Tobacco Incorporated Act of 1 April 1985 established a publicly traded stock
company that was 100% government owned until 1994. Government control has since
declined to a one-third holding in 2016 (JT, 2009; Levin, 2005; Levin, 2013).
The new corporation continued to operate as an effective monopoly, protected by high
import tariffs, and a labyrinthine domestic distribution system, which combined to limit
imports to approximately 2% of all cigarettes smoked in the country (Chaloupka & Laix-
uthai, 1996). This situation was short-lived. In 1985, the United States Trade Office
(USTR) commenced an investigation into Japanese restrictions on imported cigarettes,
beginning a process that would lead to a fundamental alteration of the domestic market
(Chaloupka & Laixuthai, 1996) and cause JT to look to overseas markets for growth
and revenue.
Methods
Google Scholar, PubMed, and JSTOR were initially searched for scholarly literature on the
Japanese tobacco industry, focusing on public health, business, and regional studies, as
well as political science and international relations. These searches returned information
and data on various aspects of the Japanese tobacco market, although there were limited
studies on the global business strategies of JT. We also reviewed available the company’s
annual reports (2006–2015), as well as financial updates and fact sheets, and consulted
industry publications including Tobacco Journal International, Tobacco Reporter, and
Tobacco Asia, general business news sources including the Financial Times and Bloomberg
News, and economic data from Euromonitor International,MarketLine, and the UN trade
database to triangulate material retrieved. The scope and evolution of the project did not
allow for interviews with Japanese policy-makers or others stakeholders, and limited it to
English-language resources. The paper adopts the analytical framework developed by Lee
and Eckhardt (2016) to structure and analyse the key drivers behind JTI’s global business
strategy, and the extent to which the company has succeeded in pursuing its global
ambitious.
Findings
What are the key factors behind JTI’s global business strategy?
JT expansion strategies have been largely in response to aggressive competition from TTCs
in a declining domestic market (Japan News, 2015). In the 1980s, Philip Morris
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International (PMI), RJ Reynolds (RJR) and Brown &Williamson (B&W) formed the U.S.
Cigarette Export Association to lobby the U.S. government to demand access to the
restricted domestic cigarette markets of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The
resulting actions taken by the USTR, and their outcomes, have been comprehensively ana-
lysed (Chaloupka & Laixuthai, 1996; MacKenzie & Collin, 2012; Taylor, Chaloupka,
Guidon, & Corbett, 2000). The threat of U.S. trade sanctions by the USTR convinced
all four countries to drop barriers to imported cigarettes.
In 1982, the Japanese government lowered the import tariff from 90% to 20%, and
allowed TTCs to advertise on television, billboards, and in magazines. The number of
licensed shops permitted to sell foreign cigarettes rose from 15,000 to 260,000, and
TTCs were allowed to establish their own sales networks, and to set prices with govern-
mental approval. In 1987, an ad valorem tax that had kept imported cigarettes more
expensive after the tariff reduction was also withdrawn by the Japanese government fol-
lowing further pressure from U.S. officials, significantly reducing the price gap between
domestic and imported brands (Honjo & Kawachi, 2000). Around the same time, the
U.S., France, Japan, United Kingdom, and West Germany signed the Plaza Accord
(1985), an agreement aimed at depreciating the U.S. dollar in relation to the German
Mark and Japanese Yen. The resulting appreciation of the Yen saw an immediate drop
in the price of foreign cigarettes.
JT’s market share dropped from 98.5% to 84.1% between 1982 and 1990, and has con-
tinued to decline, to 59.9% in 2015 (see Figure 1) due, according to the company, to ‘inten-
sifying competition’ (JT, 2016a, p. 31). Yet, with almost 60% of domestic cigarette sales,
and the producer of nine of the country’s 10 bestselling brands, JT has remained the
key player in the domestic tobacco market (Euromonitor, 2015a).
TTC competition resulted in increased smoking rates, particularly among Japanese
women (Honjo & Kawachi, 2000; Sato, Araki, & Yokoyama, 2000). Longer term
however, there has been a clear decline in smoking in Japan (see Figure 2), suggesting a
further motivation for JT to look to overseas growth opportunities. Male smoking rates
have steadily dropped from 82.3% in 1965 to 30.3% by 2014; rates among women have
Figure 2. Japan, smoking prevalence by gender. 1965 to 2014 (20 yrs+). Source: Japan Health Pro-
motion & Fitness Foundation. Adult Smoking Rate [JT’s Japan Smoking Rate Survey] http://www.
health-net.or.jp/tobacco/product/pd090000.html.
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declined from 15.7% in 1965 to 9.8% (Figure 2), and the overall smoking rate is now below
20% for the first time (Hongo, 2014). Per capita consumption has also declined markedly
since the 1975 peak of 3497 cigarettes in the late 1970s to 1618 in 2015 (Levin, 2016).
This decline has occurred despite Japan’s limited commitment to tobacco control. Levin
(2013, p. 474) argues that the Tobacco Business Act ‘reflects a political economy where
tobacco interests have extraordinary control via sympathetic legislators and, more impor-
tantly, potent agency protection given by taxation and budgetary bureaucrats in Japan’s
Ministry of Finance’. In this environment, the only significant policy developments
have been the 2002 Health Promotion Act and Japan’s ratification of the FCTC, which
have legitimised the profile of tobacco control and created increased discussion among
the public, policy-makers, and in the media. These have been augmented by gradual,
and contested, tax increases, a small number of administrative measures, and local level
smoke-free decrees (Levin, 2013).
In the absence of comprehensive regulation, the drop in smoking rates appears attribu-
table to a combination of the international obligations inherent in Japan’s ratification of
the FCTC; the later onset of the tobacco epidemic and related morbidity and mortality,
compared to the U.S.A.; the pharmaceutical industry’s promotion of smoking cessation
products which signals the entry of another key economic actor into the smoking and
health dialogue, and, seemingly, to changes in cultural attitudes to smoking (Levin, 2013).
A further motivation for JT’s global expansion has been to secure tobacco leaf at
lower price, and of better quality. The Tobacco Business Act 1984 requires the corporation
to purchase the entire usable domestic tobacco leaf crop, negotiate contracts with domestic
leaf growers, and determine the total area used for tobacco cultivation and tobacco leaf
prices (JT, 2009). This provision ensures that the country’s tobacco farming lobby
plays a key role in the politics of the company, including the government’s continued
shareholding. JT has been increasingly concerned about the quality and reliability of the
domestic crop, leading to become a global ‘natural resource seeker’ (Lee & Eckhardt,
2016).
These concerns were exacerbated by the 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster in Fukush-
ima prefecture, one of the country’s most significant agricultural areas (Johnson, 2011)
and an important supplier of tobacco leaf (Smith, 2011). In 2011, the cost of domestic
leaf was roughly 2.8 times higher than imported, contributing to JT’s growing dependence
on imported crops. The tsunami also led to the government’s decision to sell approxi-
mately one-third of its shares in 2013 to fund recovery and reconstruction; it currently
retains 33% of JT shares, the minimum holding required by law (Euromonitor, 2015a).
Discussions aimed at full privatisation continue, but political considerations would pose
obstacles in the medium term (Nikkei Asian Review, 2015).
Which global business strategies has JTI pursued?
Diversification, restructuring, and acquisition
JT’s initial response to competition from TTCs was to diversify into the pharmaceutical,
food, and beverage sectors and to expand its tobacco operations (JT, 2016a). Despite diver-
sification, tobacco still accounts for 88.6% of revenue (see Figure 3), and the decision to
leave the beverage sector at the end of 2015 is likely to mean increased concentration
on the tobacco business (Euromonitor, 2015a).
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Domestic tobacco operations have undergone significant restructuring in recent years
that includes factory closures in 2009, 2011, and 2012 (Euromonitor, 2015a). In October
2013, closure of a further four factories, a leaf processing facility, and cigarette vending
machine manufacturer due to the ‘increasingly competitive environment’ was announced,
leading to the loss of 1600 jobs through voluntary retirement by 2016 (JT, 2013). Despite
these cuts, the number of employees in the domestic tobacco business has remained rela-
tively stable, dropping only slightly from 11,940 in 2006 to 11,648 in 2014 (JT, 2010a,
2014b, 2016a).
Predominance of the international tobacco division within the corporation is largely the
result of two key acquisitions of competitor operations. In 1999, the non-U.S. operations
of RJR Nabisco were purchased for US$8 billion. While deemed an excessive price by some
analysts at the time (Strom, 1999), it was also acknowledged that few other options to
acquire a leading competitor existed, particularly as PMI and British American Tobacco
(BAT) were rumoured to also be interested in RJR’s non-U.S. business. JTI was created
to oversee international operations, and immediately became the third largest TTC
based on its rights to newly acquired leading international brands such as Camel,
Winston, and Salem, and access to markets in Europe and Canada (Strom, 1999).
If acquisition of RJR Nabisco announced the arrival of JTI as a key global actor, the US
$15 billion takeover of the Gallaher Group in 2007, then the fifth largest TTC, consoli-
dated its leading position within the industry. The deal was the largest overseas acquisition
by any Japanese company to that point, and effectively doubled JTI’s operations through
new market share in the UK and Europe (New York Times, 2007). It also significantly
expanded its global flagship brand portfolio which accounts for 60% of sales (JTI,
2016b). Gallaher brands Benson & Hedges, Silk Cut, Sobanie, LD, and Glamour were
added to Mild Seven (renamed Mevius in 2012), which originated in Japan, and
Winston and Camel, acquired in the RJR deal.
Figure 3. Japan Tobacco: revenue by segment and percentage, 2015. Source: Japan Tobacco Inc.
(2016). Annual Report FY2015.
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The 2016 US$5 billion acquisition of international rights of the Reynolds American
subsidiary, Santa Fe Natural Tobacco which produces Natural American Spirit cigarettes
(Craver, 2016), is JTI’s largest and most recent acquisition since the Gallaher takeover
(Table 1). Planned as an addition to its Global Flagship Brand portfolio (JT, 2016a), the
company describes Natural American Spirit as ‘the only truly global “additive free”,
premium cigarette with a marketing theme that is environmentally conscious and socially
progressive’ (JTI, 2015b). Natural American Spirit is currently sold in 13 countries, and
popular in Western Europe, but Japan is the biggest market for the brand outside of
the U.S. (Japan Times, 2015), suggesting the takeover had both domestic and foreign con-
sumers in mind.
Geographic distribution
JTI brands are produced in 25 factories and sold in 120 countries. As a result of the RJR
and Gallaher takeovers, markets in Western Europe and those of former Soviet Union
countries, particularly Russia, are JTI’s most important operations. In Western and
Eastern Europe, JTI holds a 20.8% and 27.5% regional share respectively (see Table 2).
However, JTI has been overtaken in Eastern Europe by PMI, and is no longer market
leader in any region. Over-reliance on European markets has made the company vulner-
able to localised volatility in smoking and sales. Market contraction in Russia, Ukraine,
and Kazakstan in 2013/2014, for example, resulted in a 10.5% drop in regional shipments
(Euromonitor, 2016b; JT, 2015a), and a significant impact on overall volume sales (see
Figure 4).
Table 1. Japan Tobacco acquisitions, 1992–2015 (JTI from 1999).
Year Company Country Product/service
2016 La Tabacarela Dominican Republic Cigarettes
Fluxo Brasil Distribuidora do Produtos Brazil Distributor
Natural American Spirit (international, non-U.S.
operations from Reynolds American Inc.)
U.S. Cigarettes and loose tobacco
2015 Arian Tobacco Industry Iran Cigarettes
Ploom, Inc. U.S. e-cigarettes (vaporiser)
2014 Zandera Ltd. UK e-cigarettes
2013 Megapolis (20% stake) Russia Distribution
Al Nakhla Tobacco Company S.A.E. & Al Nakhla
Tobacco Company
Egypt Shisha
2012 Gryson NV Belgium Fine cut tobacco
2011 Haggar Cigarette & Tobacco Factory Ltd. North Sudan Cigarettes
Haggar Cigarette & Tobacco Factory Ltd. South Sudan Cigarettes
2009 Tribac Leaf Limited UK Tobacco leaf supplier
Kannenberg & Cia. Ltda. Brazil Tobacco leaf supplier
Barker, Hall & Cotton Tabacos Ltds. Brazil Tobacco leaf supplier
2007 Gallaher Group Plc. (remaining shares) UK Cigarettes
AD Duvanska Industrija Senta Serbia Cigarettes
2005 CRES Nev Ltd.a Russia Cigarettes
2001 Austria Tabaka Austria Cigarettes
2000 Liggett-Ducata Russia Cigarettes
1999 RJR Nabisco (non-U.S. operations) U.S. Cigarettes
1995 Tanzania Cigarette Company Tanzania Cigarettes
1994 Yelets Tobaccob Russia Cigarettes
1992 Manchester Tobaccob UK Cigarettes
AS-Petrob Russia Cigarettes
bAcquired from RJR Nabisco.
aAcquired from Gallaher Group.
Sources: JT annual reports, press releases, 2006–2016; Nikkei Asian Review, 2016a; Euromonitor, 2016b.
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Taiwan is JTI’s main Asian market with a 37% market share, based largely on sale of
Mevius (Euromonitor, 2015b). In 2015, the company received permission from the Taiwa-
nese government to construct a new production facility under the terms of a 2011 Taiwan-
Japan Bilateral Investment Agreement (Taiwan-Japan, 2011). The decision has provoked
protest among public health advocates, which may delay construction (Eckhardt, Fang, &
Lee, 2017), but when completed the new factory will be JTI’s largest offshore site and man-
ufacture cigarettes for both Taiwanese smokers, thereby saving on import taxes, and for
export to Southeast Asia (Gerber, 2015). Other key Asian operations include the relatively
small Singapore market, as well as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia (Tables 2
and 3).
China, the world’s largest cigarette market, remains all but closed to foreign manufac-
turers, and the China National Tobacco Corporation’s (CNTC) 98.3% share of sales leaves
little room for competitors. JTI is third among TTCs in China at 0.1% of sales, behind BAT
(0.6%) and PMI (0.5%) (Euromonitor, 2016a). In 2003, JT established a China Division to
oversee operations in China, Hong Kong, and Macau within its domestic tobacco
Table 2. Retail market share (%); selected regions and leading cigarette manufacturers.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Asia Pacific
CNTC 66.3 67.4 67.4 67.8 68.5
PMI 8.1 8.4 8.6 8.1 8.1
JTI 6.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.1
BAT 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3
Eastern Europe
PMI 27.0 26.9 27.3 27.2 28.3
JTI 27.4 27.6 27.8 28.5 27.5
BAT 19.4 20.0 20.9 21.2 21.2
Imperial 12.4 12.3 11.9 111.4 11.1
Middle East and Africa
BAT 21.8 23.7 24.7 25.3 27.1
PMI 13.8 13.8 14.6 17.0 18.6
Imperial 16.3 16.0 16.8 17.9 17.8
JTI 13.0 13.7 14.1 14.1 14.1
Western Europe
PMI 37.0 38.0 38.6 38.9 38.2
JTI 18.0 18.4 19.2 19.8 20.8
BAT 19.7 19.3 19.0 18.3 18.1
Imperial 17.5 17.0 16.3 16.4 16.4
Note: JTI figures are highlighted as the company is the focus of the paper.
Source: Euromonitor International (2016b). Tobacco Industry. Statistics. London: Euromonitor.
Figure 4. Global Cigarette Volume Sales Versus Japan Tobacco Sales, 2011–2014. Source: JTI annual
report 2015.
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Table 3. JTI export volumes by regiona in billion sticks.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total 203.1 215.1 203.3 198.8 212.4 220.3 240.1 385.6 452.3 434.9 428.4 425.7 436.5 417.5 398.0
Asia 38.0 42.0 39.0 40.4 40.6 33.5 29.1
Europe 37.0 38.0 38.0 36.9 38.1 39.2 44.1
Americas 11.0 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.3 8.8
CISa & Others 118.0 124.0 116.0 111.6 123.8 138.3 158.0
North & Central Europe 39.3 50.8 47.5 49.0 49.1 49.9 51.3 51.6
South & West Europe 55.2 64.0 64.5 63.2 60.8 62.7 61.1 59.8
CIS 195.1 219.7 214.6 203.6 197.8 197.4 185.2 165.7
Rest of the Worldb 95.9 117.1 108.4 112.7 118.0 126.5 119.9 120.8
Note: aJTI categorisation of regions changed in 2007; bIncludes Turkey.
Source: Compiled from Japan Tobacco Inc., Annual Reports, 2006–2014.
G
LO
BA
L
PU
BLIC
H
EA
LTH
289
operations, transferring these markets from JTI (He, Takeuchi, & Yano, 2010). Reported
sales volumes from the China Division are combined with Domestic Duty-Free in
company annual reports, making assessment of operations in China difficult. Between
2008 and 2014, the two divisions sold approximately 3.5 billion cigarettes annually,
accounting for an average of 3.5% of sales by JT’s domestic operation (JT, 2014b).
JTI has a 14% share of the Middle East and African markets despite significant gains
made by PMI and, particularly, Imperial Tobacco over the past decade. Negligible pres-
ence in Latin America (2.1% of sales) is based on operations in Bolivia, Argentina, and
Mexico, and it has a presence in North America, capturing just 1.3% of sales.
Recent acquisitions in the Middle East and Africa, aimed at expanding sales beyond its
key European markets, have included purchase of the Tehran-based Arian Tobacco Indus-
try by Iranian subsidiary JTI Pars in 2015 resulted in 40% market share, and moved JTI
ahead of BAT as market leader (Bozorgmehr, 2015). Expansion in Africa, where large
increases in smoking rates will occur in coming decades have been particularly important.
In 2011, a JTI executive vice-president underlined the importance of ‘gaining a foothold’ in
this ‘very energetic and growing market’ (Ozasa & Onomitsu, 2011), and company brands
are now sold in more than 20 African countries. In 2011, the company increased its share
in the Tanzania Cigarette Company from 51% to 75%, and now controls a 97% market
share in the country (Ozasa & Onomitsu, 2011).
It also acquired the Haggar Cigarette & Tobacco Factory which holds an 80% market
share in the Republic of Sudan, along with operations in South Sudan that same year (JTI,
2011). In 2015, JTI announced the purchase of a 40% share of National Tobacco Enter-
prise Ethiopia, providing the company with the ‘opportunity to leverage our successful
experience in other Middle East and African markets’ (JTI, 2015a). African leaf producers
have also been targeted for takeovers and investment to improve security of supply. JTI
took over Africa Leaf (Malawi) in 1999 (JTI Malawi, 2016) and, since 2010, JTI Leaf
Zambia has been supported by the Zambia-Japan Trade and Investment Promotion
program which contracts farmers to grow tobacco in collaboration schemes (Chanda,
2014). In 2009, JTI bought the leaf tobacco business of the UK-based dealer Tribac Leaf
which includes operations in Malawi, Zambia, China, and India.
Efforts to raise its relatively low Latin America profile have included acquisition of two
Brazilian companies, Kannenberg & Cia and Kannenberg, Barker, Hail & Cotton Tabacos
(KBH&C), and agreeing a joint venture with the U.S. producers Hail & Cotton, and JEB
International (Tobacco International, 2009). In 2016, JTI’s purchased the Brazilian ciga-
rette distributer Fluxo Brasil Distribuidora do Produtos for an undisclosed amount
(Nikkei Asian Review, 2016a), and a 50% stake in the Dominican cigarette manufacturer
La Tabacarela (Nikkei Asian Review, 2016b).
Product diversity and development
Although JTI relies on eight global flagship brands for 60% of cigarette sales (JTI, 2016a), it
produces more than 100 tobacco products. It continues to extend its product range, con-
centrating on three key portfolio categories: manufactured cigarettes; fine, or loose cut
tobacco; and what are described as ‘emerging products’ (JT, 2015a). In May 2012, it pur-
chased Gryson, a Belgium-based manufacturer of roll-your-own and loose tobacco pro-
ducts that holds a 21% share of the market in France (Yamaguchi & Boyle, 2012).
Reflecting changes in global tobacco use, JTI has also added non-cigarette tobacco
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products to its holdings, investing in e-vapour and tobacco-vapour products. In 2014, the
company bought UK-based Zandera, producer of E-Lites electronic cigarette (Schroter,
2014), and introduced E-Lites Curv in the UK, Ireland, and Germany (JT, 2016a). Logic
Technology Development of Florida, which accounts for approximately 20% of e-cigarette
sales in U.S. convenience store, was acquired in 2015, making JTI the third largest e-ciga-
rette company in the U.S. (JT, 2016a). The company also acquired U.S.-based Ploom’s
heat-not-burn vaporiser system, which is being adapted for initial release in the Japanese
market, with longer term plans to expand into other markets (JT, 2016a).
In 2013, the company also moved into the shisha (hookah) tobacco market by acquiring
the Al Nakhla Tobacco Company and Al Nakhla Tobacco Company of Egypt, described in
one market analysis as a deal ‘with exquisite rationale’ (MacGuill, 2012) for JTI. Both take-
overs and investments have been central to JTI’s strategies in Africa. Among the world’s
largest shisha producers, Nakhla’s products are sold in 80 countries, primarily in the
Middle East and North Africa. JTI smokeless tobacco products also include the Zerostyle
Mint, described as a new-style snuff tobacco product that has been aimed, so far, at the
domestic market (JT, 2010b). JTI’s snus brands, including versions of Camel, and LD
tobacco, are aimed primarily at Scandinavian consumers (JT, 2016a).
Management and expertise
Like market leader PMI, JTI is headquartered in Switzerland. The Geneva office oversees
operations in 120 companies and some 26,000 employees representing, according to
company information, more than 100 nationalities. In a break from Japanese corporate
tradition, in which the national hierarchical management style is imposed on foreign oper-
ations (Yuk, 2010), only two of its 17-member Executive Committee are Japanese
nationals. The company reportedly relies heavily on international management and exper-
tise (JTI, 2016c).
Marketing, advertising and corporate social responsibility initiatives
Detailed figures on JTI marketing spending are not readily available. It is known, however,
that tobacco companies spent approximately US$9 billion on marketing activities in the
U.S. alone in 2013, which provides some indication of the scale of marketing undertaken
by leading TTCs (United States. Federal Trade Commission, 2016).
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an important element of current industry pro-
motional strategy, and if counterintuitive in the case of cigarette manufacturers, related
initiatives can be an effective means of counteracting criticism, and influencing the
tobacco control agenda by pre-empting legislation (Fooks and Gilmore (2013). JTI (and
parent company JT) has employed extensive CSR and philanthropy initiatives aimed at
burnishing its image by highlighting financial support for social projects and a commit-
ment to sustainability (JT, 2015b). Recent JTI projects include on-going financial
support for communities recovering from the 2011 earthquake, and more than 250 pro-
jects connected to well over 120 partnerships in the fields of social welfare, arts and culture,
environmental protection, and disaster relief.
Many of these CSR activities are initiated by the JTI Foundation, which reportedly
works with 21 partner organisations in nineteen countries (JT, 2015b). Presumably in
response to criticisms of tobacco industry operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, including
use of child labour (Otañez, Muggli, Hurt, & Glantz, 2006), JT established the Achieving
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Reduction of Child Labour in Supporting Education (ARISE), in partnership with the U.S.
NGO Winrock International, and the International Labour Organization with the aim of
eliminating child labour where it did business (JT, 2016b).
How globalised is JTI to date?
Applying the key indicators set out by Lee and Eckhardt (2016) suggests that JTI’s global
business strategy has been successful, and response to current downturns in key markets
and development of new smoking technologies suggests a continued pursuit of take-over
opportunities across the supply chain as a key part of its globalisation strategies. As
recently as 2007, JT’s domestic operations accounted for almost three-quarters
(71.7%) of group net sales (JT, 2008), but this has now been surpassed by international
operations in terms of revenue share (Euromonitor, 2015a) (see Figure 3). The com-
pany’s global profile is underlined by inclusion in Fortune’s Global 500 list of the
world’s largest companies by revenue, and its ranking among the world’s 75 most trans-
nationalised companies by the United Conference on Trade and Development’s
(UNCTAD) transnationality index. Furthermore, JTI is ranked 90th on UNCTAD’s
list of global companies with the largest amount of foreign assets (Hawkins, Holden,
Eckhardt, & Lee, 2016).
Discussion
JTI’s emergence as the third largest TTC has been based on an aggressive strategy of major
foreign acquisitions, licensing agreements, and joint ventures with a range of tobacco
product manufacturers, leaf growers, and distributors. This has been accompanied by
the development and diversification into new smoking technologies.
As with the tobacco industry more generally, the company faces major challenges in
upcoming decades however. Declining smoking rates in many of its key markets, most
notably Russia and the UK, and the potential impact of greater adoption to tobacco
control measures in Eastern Europe are compounded by the decreasing proportion of
smokers in Japan (Hedley, 2016). JTI’s likely continued pursuit of mergers and acqui-
sitions has led to speculation that it may bid for UK-based Imperial Tobacco, currently
the fourth-largest TTC (Euromonitor, 2016b) The latter’s product range, which includes
Davidoff, Winston and Kool cigarettes, Drum loose tobacco, blu e-cigarettes, and Rizla
rolling papers, would significantly enhance JTI’s existing product portfolio. A merged
JTI/Imperial would create an industry leader across the Middle East and Africa; joint
market leader with PMI in Eastern andWestern Europe; and hold a 25% share across Aus-
tralasian markets (Euromonitor, 2016a). There would, however, be only modest gains in
the Americas and Asia.
JTI would face significant obstacles if it were to attempt a takeover. Imperial’s stock
price has risen as speculation that BAT (Chambers, 2015), and possibly the CNTC
(Elder, 2015), are also interested. There are also concerns that a takeover by JTI or BAT
would breach anti-trust regulations in many countries. In the UK, for instance, JTI and
Imperial currently hold a combined 71% market share (Euromonitor, 2016a), leading ana-
lysts to suggest that any takeover is likely to involve a carve-up in which JTI and BAT
acquire different parts of Imperial’s operations (Geller & Berry, 2015).
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Implications for public health
As a leading company in an industry that causes an estimated 6 million annual deaths
(World Health Organization, 2015), JTI’s successful globalisation strategy has clear impli-
cations for public health. The 1999 takeover of RJR and formation of JTI, was a key event
in the globalisation of the tobacco industry during the late twentieth century, a period
characterised by consolidation that has left four TTCs with a 40% share of global cigarette
sales1 and aggressive expansion into low and middle-income countries that has been facili-
tated by trade liberalisation (Taylor et al., 2000).
TTC strategies to block, impede, and circumvent meaningful tobacco control regulation
are well-established, and claims of compliance and responsible corporate conduct are
rightly met with scepticism (Lee, Ling, & Glantz, 2012; Proctor, 2001). Recent industry
response to plain packaging is a case in point. JTI, with the other three leading TTCs,
has mounted unsuccessful legal challenges in Australia (Martin, 2016) the United
Kingdom (Croft, 2016), and France (Tobacco Journal International, 2016), and has
announced plans to appeal the decisions in the two European countries. JTI’s public pos-
ition, that ‘[e]xtreme measures, such as plain packaging of tobacco products…will not
eliminate smoking by minors, or cause minors to stop smoking’ reflects the company’s
broader stance on tobacco control, which is to reserve ‘right to question, and if necessary
challenge, regulation that is flawed, unreasonable, disproportionate, or without an eviden-
tiary foundation, in order to protect its legitimate business interests’ (JTI, 2012).
Publications establishing tobacco industry complicity in global cigarette smuggling are
summarised in a 2016 analysis by Joossens, Gilmore, Stoklosa, and Ross (2016). JTI’s
involvement in illicit trade has been described by Wen et al. (2006) in their analysis of
Taiwan’s 1986 decision to drop restrictions on imported cigarettes that allowed leading
U.S.-based producers and BAT to enter the domestic market, but excluded JTI. Faced
with uncompetitive excise rates, JTI resorted to ‘massive smuggling’ of its brands into
Taiwan via a Swiss subsidiary that created legal cover (Wen et al., 2006). In 2007, JTI
settled a dispute with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to avoid smuggling-
related litigation that involved cooperation in tackling the contraband cigarette trade,
payment of a €400 million fine, and agreement to make payments equal to 100% of
evaded taxes related to future seizure of illicit volumes of their brands (PMI, BAT, and
Imperial have reached similar agreements) (Joossens et al., 2016). Subsequent analysis,
however, indicates that JTI and competitor TTCs have continued their involvement in
illicit trade, and that JTI has been ‘less than less than compliant with the EU agreement’
(Joossens et al., 2016).
Industry opposition extends to global governance and challenges to the FCTC (WHO,
2003), which are well-documented. Strategies have included lobbying national FCTC del-
egations and governments; arguing that the treaty would have negative economic impacts;
raising doubts about the WHO’s mandate to develop a legally binding international agree-
ment; and to propose less rigorous alternative agreements (Balwicki, Stokłosa, Balwicka-
Szczyrba, & Tomczak, 2015; Mamudu, Hammond, & Glantz, 2008; Weishaar et al., 2012).
Japan’s ratification of the treaty in 2004, (United Nations, 2016) given that the country is
‘an especially important player in the global governance regime under the FCTC in light of
profound conflicts arising from its Minister of Finance’s on-going position as the control-
ling shareholder of Japan Tobacco Inc’ (Levin, 2016).
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Assunta and Chapman (2006) found that Japanese government negotiators, looking to
protect JT’s domestic and international business, successfully exploited the treaty’s con-
sensus formula to have proposals for optional measures included, and the final text of
the treaty accommodates flexibility on interpretation and implementation of key
tobacco control issues. Since ratification, Japan has continued to take an ambiguous pos-
ition on the treaty. For instance, Japan sent senior members of the Ministry of Finance’s
tobacco and tax divisions as part of its delegation to the November 2012 Fifth Conference
of the Parties in direct contravention of FCTC Article 5.3 (Levin, 2013), which requires
Parties to protect their tobacco control policy-making from tobacco industry interference
(WHO, 2003). Inclusion of Ulle Geir, JTI’s director of international trade among the
speakers at UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum in Kenya in 2016 provides a more
recent illustration of the company’s seeming strategies to influence the global health dis-
course (UNCTAD, 2016). Geir was removed from the list of speakers following complaints
by global tobacco control advocates, who argued that tobacco was a barrier to develop-
ment and cited the UN General Assembly’s recognition of the fundamental conflict of
interest between the tobacco industry and public health in 2011 (Framework Convention
Alliance, 2016).
In 2014, JTI offered its own, idiosyncratic, interpretation of Article 5.3. In his criticism
of closed door meetings at the Sixth Conference of the Parties, the company’s vice-presi-
dent for global regulatory strategy described the situation as an abuse of 5.3 ‘which is now
commonly used as an excuse to shut out the tobacco sector and anyone who is perceived to
be linked to us’ leaving the meetings to be ‘again hijacked by the tobacco control lobbyists
who freely exercise undue influence’ (JTI, 2014). The government’s attitude toward the
treaty is neatly summarised in its 2014 FCTC implementation report which confirms
that it does protect public health related to tobacco control from the interests of the
tobacco industry (WHO, 2014).
Speculation around the government’s future role in the company has continued since it
reduced its holding to 33% under the terms of the Reconstruction Act, 2011. The Act also
directs the government to assess, by 2023, the potential of withdrawing completely from
JTI, a scenario mentioned by the company’s 2015 annual report (JTI, 2015b). Government
disposal of its remaining shares would, according to one market analysis, would be likely
to lead to a ‘profound liberalisation and restructuring of the company’ that would include
selling off non-tobacco divisions and further international acquisitions (Euromonitor,
2016b). Yet, such restructuring may not be in the company’s best interest as the current
situation allows JTI to rest ‘easily at home in its Tokyo sanctuary’ (Levin, 2013) where
it benefits from government support for global expansion.
Note
1. PMI (14.7), BATA (10.8%), JTI (10.8%) and Imperial (5.0%) accounted for 39.3% of global
cigarette sales in 2015. Sales within China by the CNTC accounted for 44% of total (Euro-
monitor, 2016a).
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